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Article
Many American domestic policies are aimed at encouraging 
middle-class families to save and build financial assets, 
including tax-sheltered retirement contributions, 529 plans, 
and mortgage interest deductions. These assets play an 
important role in a family’s economic and psychosocial well-
being. Household savings can be especially critical in times 
of recession and high unemployment. Programs aimed at the 
very poor, however, often discourage savings and financial 
independence.
Beginning in the early 1980s, social welfare policy moved 
toward a “stick” approach in public assistance eligibility, 
eliminating the “carrot” of wealth accumulation that plays a 
prominent role in the middle-class tax policies mentioned 
above (McDonald, Orszag, & Russell, 2005). Meanwhile, 
private sector policy shifted in a similar direction with the 
decline of employer provided pension funds. These changes 
in the public and private sectors have coincided with a grow-
ing gap in wealth accumulation between the highest and low-
est income households (McKernan, Ratcliffe, Steuerle, & 
Zhang, 2013). Of the myriad explanations for this disparity, 
restrictive eligibility rules may play an important role. For 
example, low resource limits (maximum allowable financial 
assets for eligibility) in the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) program are associated with lower savings 
rates among all low-income families, not just those receiving 
TANF (Nam, 2008).
For this reason, several states have eliminated or signifi-
cantly increased asset limits for TANF eligibility. While some 
worry that allowing applicants to maintain greater assets 
would cause an unsustainable swelling of caseload size, two 
early adopters of elimination from Ohio (eliminated in 1997) 
and Virginia (eliminated in 2004), found that caseloads actu-
ally decreased after this change (Parrish, 2005). However, 
five other states that eliminated or significantly increased 
their asset test (Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Los Angeles, 
and Maryland) did so between 2007 and 2011, in the midst of 
the Great Recession, so it is important to determine whether 
this policy continues to be workable during periods of 
increased social need. The aim of this study is to ascertain 
whether elimination or significant increase of the asset test is 
associated with changes in caseload size since the beginning 
of the Great Recession.
Literature Review
Asset building is an important source of security for families, 
especially in times of economic crisis. In essence, “poverty is 
a trap of low assets” (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006, p. 385). 
Low-income households that tend to have limited savings 
run the risk of financial ruin due to a sudden medical emer-
gency, immediate household needs, and so on. Ownership of 
assets also shifts people’s concepts about the future and by 
casting the future in a positive light, actually improves well-
being in the present. A study by Yadama and Sherraden 
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(1996) based on data collected from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), an ongoing longitudinal survey of 
5,000 families, supported the idea that assets positively influ-
ence expectations and confidence about the future and 
encourage people to make specific plans with regard to work 
and family. Furthermore, a positive association exists 
between a mother’s assets (home ownership and savings) 
and a child’s educational achievements (Zhan & Sherraden, 
2003).
Asset limits in social programs, such as TANF, have tradi-
tionally been put in place to allocate assistance to people 
without the means to support themselves. Those who fall 
above the set asset limits are deemed capable of self-suffi-
ciency and are therefore excluded from assistance programs. 
However, some have argued that asset tests actually discour-
age savings (Chen & Lerman, 2005; Rand, 2007). A study by 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) found that asset-based 
social programs are associated with low savings accumula-
tion among low-income households. The authors suggest 
that this is due to a lack of incentive to save, because saving 
will disqualify families from social programs instead of 
guaranteeing self-sufficiency. With many limits as low as 
US$2,000 (Urban Institute, 2010), saving even US$2,001 
would make a family ineligible for assistance but practically 
unable to weather any but the smallest financial setback.
States were allowed greater flexibility in setting asset lim-
its for Aid to Families with Dependent Children until the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which created 
much lower allowances (US$1,200 for a vehicle and 
US$1,000 in other liquid assets) than many states had previ-
ously set (McDonald et al., 2005; Nam, 2008). Powers 
(1998) studied changes in savings behaviors among low-
income, female-headed households before and after 1981 
and discovered that savings decreased by an average of 25 
cents for every dollar decrease in asset limit. States were 
once again allowed to set asset limits after the passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA); however, many states have yet to 
change limits from levels established in the 1980s (McDonald 
et al., 2005).
Increased resource limits are associated with the accumu-
lation of multiple types of assets, including savings accounts, 
vehicle ownership, and savings for retirement. Hurst and 
Ziliak (2006) reviewed changes in savings among low-
income families after passage of the PRWORA. In states 
with expanded TANF asset limits, single mothers were 13% 
more likely to own a car for every US$1,000 increase in asset 
allowance. Similar studies have suggested that lessening 
asset restrictions on vehicle ownership can lead to eligible 
individuals increasing vehicle assets (Bansak, Mattson, & 
Rice, 2010; Owens & Baum, 2012; Sullivan, 2006). Owens 
and Baum (2012) found that eliminating vehicles from asset 
tests is associated with increased vehicle ownership by any-
where from 8% to 20%. Vehicle ownership in turn makes it 
easier for people to access jobs and resources, further increas-
ing a family’s economic security.
Since the 1980s, many companies have made a vast shift 
from employer-managed pension plans toward retirement 
saving plans managed mainly by employees, such as 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401Ks. 
Meanwhile, most asset-limit restrictions have not been re-
evaluated. As is, low asset-limit rules are in fact a disincen-
tive for many families to save for retirement (McDonald et 
al., 2005). Significantly, the longer a state has allowed 
increased assets in TANF eligibility, the more likely low-
income families are to accumulate savings and have bank 
accounts (Nam, 2008).
In summary, wealth accumulation for low-income house-
holds is an essential element of both financial and psychoso-
cial well-being. Eligibility rules for TANF have the potential 
ability to either reward or penalize this behavior. Ohio was 
the first state to eliminate TANF asset limits in 1997 (Rand, 
2007). Although a slight increase in caseload was expected, 
caseloads actually remained at a record low and Ohio 
received high-performance bonuses for labor force attach-
ment. Virginia has experienced a similar lack of caseload 
increase since an administrative rule change in 2004 that 
eliminated TANF asset limits. Virginia’s Department of 
Social Services has also predicted that eliminating the asset 
test could “increase the assistance provided by US$127,200 
for 40 families and provide US$323,050 savings in adminis-
trative staff time annually” (Rand, 2007, p. 629), in essence 
saving the state money. These anecdotal findings ought to be 
more thoroughly investigated in order to determine the prac-
tical viability of elimination. The aim of this study, therefore, 
is to investigate the effect of significantly raising or cancel-
ing the asset limit on TANF caseloads by state.
Method
Data on the asset limits for TANF eligibility by state are 
available via the Urban Institute’s (2010) Welfare Rules 
Databook. Data on the caseloads by state and total caseloads 
for the United States as a whole are available via the 
Administration for Children and Families (2013). The asset-
limit data available by state was first screened to identify 
states that had substantially raised, or abolished, their non-
vehicular asset limits between 2007 and 2011. Substantially, 
here, implies a raise of the limit to ≥US$10,000. This amount 
was chosen, as it is consistent with recommendations by 
advocacy organizations such as the Corporation for 
Enterprise Development and proposed in President Obama’s 
2011 budget (Greer & Levin, 2014). The five states fitting 
these criteria are listed in Table 1.
Alterations in the non-cash asset limits (vehicles, IRAs, 
529s, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), 401Ks, 
etc.) by state will not be considered for the purposes of this 
analysis for two reasons. First, these criteria vary signifi-
cantly in type and detail between states, which makes a 
cross-state comparison very difficult and of little explanatory 
value. Second, in the instance of vehicles, the non-cash asset 
limit is likely to have little effect on the saving habits of 
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lower-income individuals and families, because one cannot, 
by definition, save a non-cash asset.
Of the states that fit our criteria for asset-limit changes in 
the time frame, the total number of individual TANF recipi-
ents per month was analyzed. Monthly caseload data are 
given in 15-month periods, running from the start of the 
Federal fiscal year to the end of the following calendar year. 
This means that the data for October to December for each 
year overlap with the following year’s data from the 
Administration for Children and Families website and occa-
sionally are subject to revision. This was not the case for any 
of the states in this study, so no adjustments to the figures 
were necessary.
The TANF caseload analysis will answer two questions: 
(a) How has the caseload changed since the rule change for 
each state? and (b) How has the rate of increase (or decrease) 
of new caseloads changed since the asset-limit change for 
each state?
We have transformed the monthly caseload data from the 
ordinary calendar style so that all months are now reckoned 
relative to the month of the rule change in that state, which 
we denote as Month 0. To test for significant changes in case-
loads over time, we use a segmented regression model 
(Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, & Ross-Degnan, 2002). The 
Durbin–Watson test was used to evaluate the level of auto-
correlation among errors (Durbin & Watson, 1950), and 
when significant autocorrelation was present, we used an 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model 
to reduce bias in the estimates of intercept and slope changes 
for each state.
A second method to address the question of how abrupt 
policy changes may be affecting caseloads over time is to 
look for unique “change points” in the time series trends. To 
find the most likely change points in the time series for each 
state, a bootstrapping search algorithm was applied to the 
entire time series (Muggeo, 2003, 2008). Starting values of 
24 months and 32 months were used for the search patterns 
to allow for any lag in the implementation of the policies. 
Even with these starting points, the algorithm can efficiently 
search all possible segments dividing points for the most 
likely change point values. All analyses were performed 
using the R statistical programming language (R Development 
Team, 2013).
Findings
To compare the different state caseload trends visually on the 
same graphic, caseload numbers were transformed to repre-
sent a percentage increase or decrease compared with the 
zero time point. Also, the time variable was centered such 
that the zero point for each state represents the date of the 
policy change. A cursory visual inspection of the time series 
for the five states under consideration reveals no common 
trend in behavior in the 2 years following the rule change 
(Figure 1). Colorado (asset-limit change in October 2006)1 
shows a drop in caseload of around 30% relative to the 
Month 0 caseload. Virginia (September 2004) shows a slight 
drop in caseload of less than 10%. Alabama, Delaware, and 
Maryland show minor or moderate increases in caseload 
(<20%) relative to Month 0. Louisiana shows a periodic rise 
and then fall of caseloads, which may indicate a seasonal 
employment relationship of some kind.
Estimates for any change in caseload levels and slopes are 
shown in Table 2. As is evident from Figure 1, every state 
had first- or second-order trends in the time series. Durbin–
Watson tests for each timeline indicated that error terms were 
in fact correlated, so the point estimates in Table 2 are from 
ARIMA regression models.
When the existing trends in the data are taken into account, 
Louisiana is the only state with significant changes in either 
level or slope of caseloads. Compared with the 24 months 
prior to the policy change in Louisiana, there was an average 
decrease in the TANF caseload of approximately 1,000 cases 
and concomitant rise in the number of cases added per month 
of approximately 230 cases.
The change point analysis reveals a similarly inconsistent 
pattern of changes in caseload trends both before and after 
the policy changes. Estimated change points and fitted 
regression lines for the resulting segments are shown in 
Figure 2. The two estimated change points for Louisiana, for 
example, were approximately 8 and 12 months before any 
policy changes took effect, so it is unlikely that any increases 
in caseloads over the 4-year period examined could be attrib-
uted to any change in asset limits for TANF. The states of 
Alabama, Delaware, and Maryland had estimated change 
points after the change in asset limits (14.5, 14.6, and 19.7 
months, respectively). In all three of these cases, the change 
points were associated with sharp downward trends in TANF 
caseloads. In the case of Colorado, there does seem to be a 
leveling off in what had been an already decreasing trend in 
TANF caseloads that occurs at approximately 10.3 months 
after the change in asset limits. This could be a lagged effect 
of the policy changes, but it would be difficult to assign a 
cause without further analysis.
In summary, a large increase in asset limits for TANF eli-
gibility, or the abolishment of those limits, does not appear to 
have any causal affect to increase either the number of case-
loads or the rate of caseload growth in any of the states 
examined.
Table 1. States With Eliminated or Significantly Increased Asset 
Limits.
State Asset limit Rule change
Alabama No limit Eliminated as of 10/1/09
Colorado No limit Increased to US$15,000 in 10/2006
Eliminated entirely as of 1/7/2011.
Delaware US$10,000 Increased as of 9/1/09
Louisiana No limit Eliminated as of 1/1/09
Maryland No limit Eliminated as of 5/1/10
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Discussion
We are aware that the data set is small, and conclusions can-
not be drawn from it without caution. However, the fact that 
the states in this data set enacted their rule changes during the 
height of the worst economic recession in living memory and 
still found no associated increase in caseload or rate of case-
load growth is, we submit, powerfully suggestive of the idea 
that the asset limit does not affect TANF caseloads. Because 
each state appears to be experiencing its own individual 
caseload trajectory independent of the asset-limit rule 
change, it is possible that local-level factors are influencing 
the change, including economic conditions or additional pol-
icy changes that either restrict or liberalize eligibility.
It would be difficult to design a deeper test of this idea than 
to substantially raise the asset limits for TANF eligibility in 
three states whose unemployment rates were, at the time of 
the rule change, at least three percentage points higher than 
the average rate in the decade prior to the recession (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2013). We regard the lack of impact of 
asset-limit changes on caseload in these cases as powerful 
evidence suggesting that these two factors are not correlated.
The ability to build assets is critical to the financial stabil-
ity of low-income families, especially in times of economic 
recession. However, previously discussed research sug-
gests that low asset limits in public assistance create a dis-
incentive for the poor to save and sends a message that 
savings is discouraged. The greatest barrier to remediation 
appears to be a political one (Sprague & Black, 2012). 
Legislators and state human service administrators in many 
states fear that this rule change would “open the flood-
gates” to persons with large financial assets and eventual 
Table 2. Changes in TANF Caseload in the 24 Months Before and After Asset-Limit Rule Change.
State
Level change estimate Slope change estimate Change point estimate
Monthly p Slope p Point 1 Point 2
Alabama −786.43 .36 66.20 .91 −6.3 14.5
Colorado −123.13 .84 −363.01 .15 −7.1 10.3
Delaware 40.81 .94 −157.03 .40 4.5 14.6
Louisiana −1,001.25 .02 231.44 .01 −11.9 −7.6
Maryland 1,091.73 .47 −620.93 .11 −6.0 19.7
Note. Change point indicates month at which caseload change is estimated in the 24 months before and after the rule change, ranging from −24 to 24. 
Therefore, a Point-1 value of −6.3 would indicate that the first change is estimated to have occurred 6.3 months before the rule change (Month 0), and a 
Point-2 value of 14.5 is estimated to have occurred 14.5 months after the rule change. TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
Figure 1. Relative caseload by state for the period encompassing the change in asset limits by state.
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misuse of public funds. These fears have been fueled by 
media reports of a lottery winner continuing to receive 
assistance after elimination of the asset test (Susman, 
2012). This anecdotal information must be supplemented 
by empirical research regarding the true effect on caseload 
size. This analysis of five states that have eliminated their 
asset test in the midst of the greatest economic decline since 
the Great Depression is especially relevant as a measure of 
the safety net’s stability in times of greatest citizen need. 
Future research ought to explore whether the elimination or 
significant increase of the asset limit has indeed boosted 
savings rates among low-income families, as predicted by 
research conducted prior to these changes (Hurst & Ziliak, 
2006; Nam, 2008).
Figure 2. State caseload time series with estimated change points.
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